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OUTPATIENT COMMITMENT: THE ROLE OF
COUNSEL IN PRESERVING CLIENT AUTONOMY
I.

INTRODUCTION

As long-term institutionalization for mentally ill people became
disfavored, states began to develop programs for involuntary outpatient
commitment ("IOC") 1 to provide treatment for mental illness. 2 IOC
statutes allow a court to order outpatient treatment for a mentally ill person
who can live safely in the community while being treated.3 Such courtmandated treatment usually consists of psychiatric medication, but may
also include services such as psychotherapy or case management. 4 In most
states, IOC is subject to the same criteria as involuntary inpatient
commitment, and is considered the least restrictive alternative to inpatient
hospitalization or as a conditional release for patients who are being
released from hospitalization.5
In addition to providing a less restrictive alternative to
institutionalization, some states' IOC statutes aim to prevent mentally ill

1 Similar laws are sometimes referred to as "assisted outpatient treatment" ("AOT") or
simply as "outpatient commitment" ("OPC").
2

See Steven Strang, Note, Assisted Outpatient Treatment in Ohio: Is Jason's Law Life-

Saving Legislation or a Rash Response?, 19 HEALTH MATRIX 247, 250-52 (2009) (reviewing

history of deinstitutionalization and development of community-based treatment); Kathryn A.
Worthington, Note, Kendra's Law and the Rights of the Mentally Ill: An EmpiricalPeek Behind
the Courts' Legal Analysis and a Suggested Template for the New York State Legislature 's
Reconsideration for Renewal in 2010, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 213, 216-17 (2009)

(discussing development of outpatient treatment programs in response to deinstitutionalization).
3 See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5345-5349.5 (West 2010); N.Y. MENTAL HYG.
LAW § 9.60 (Consol. Supp. 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-271 (2011); see also Assisted
OutpatientTreatment Laws, TREATMENT ADvoc. CENTER, http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.
org/index.php?option-com content&task-wiew&id-39&Itemid-68 (Jan. 2012) (advocating use
of court-ordered treatment to increase medication compliance).
4 See OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, N.Y. STATE, KENDRA'S LAW: FINAL REPORT ON THE
STATUS OF ASSISTED OUTPATIENT TREATMENT 11 (2005) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT], available
at
http://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/Kendra web/finalreport/AOTFinal2005 .pdf
(reporting
participation in various psychiatric services by recipients of court-ordered treatment).
5 See Jennifer Honig & Susan Stefan, New Research Continues to Challenge the Need for
Outpatient Commitment, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 109, 110 (2005)

(defining types of outpatient commitment). Thirteen states have more lenient criteria for IOC
than for inpatient commitment. See TREATMENT ADvoc. CENTER, ASSISTED PSYCHIATRIC
TREATMENT

INPATIENT AND

OUTPATIENT

STANDARDS

BY STATE

(2011),

available at

http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/State -Standards - The ChartJune 28 201 1.pdf (compiling inpatient and outpatient commitment standards by state).
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people from reaching the point of requiring hospitalization. 6 These statutes
"widen the net" of the state mental health system by allowing that system
to supervise people with a severe mental illness who are not currently
subject to involuntary hospitalization. 7 Furthermore, these statutes intend
to protect the public from violence committed by people with an untreated
mental illness.8 They also aim to improve public health by providing
treatment to mentally ill people before their condition becomes severe
enough to require hospitalization. 9
This Note discusses IOC statutes from the perspective of mentally
ill clients and their attorneys. IOC statutes, especially those including
preventative 10C, are often passed after a highly-publicized violent crime
committed by a mentally ill person, and advocates of the laws defend them
based on the risk of violence they argue mentally ill individuals pose to the
community.' 0 The methods used to compel treatment for violent, mentally
ill individuals are then applied to nonviolent, mentally ill individuals."
Although nonviolent, mentally ill people may require some form of
community-based care to prevent homelessness or institutionalization, this
Note argues that applying a standard to all mentally ill people that assumes

See Honig & Stefan, supra note 5, at 110 (defining types of outpatient commitment); see
also FLA. STAY.ANN. § 394.4655 (West 2011); MICH. COMP.LAWS ANN. § 330.1401(401)(1)(d)
(West Supp. 2011) (detailing examples of preventative IOC statutes); MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60.
6

7 See, e.g., WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5345-5349.5; MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 122C-271; see also Erin O'Connor, Note, IsKendra's Law a Keeper? How Kendra 's
Law Erodes Fundamental Rights of the Mentally Ill,11 J.L. & POL'Y 313, 321-23 (2002)

(describing preventative outpatient commitment for individuals who do not meet standard for
inpatient hospitalization).
8 See Rachel A. Scherer, Note, Toward a Twenty-First Century Civil Commitment Statute: A
Legal, Medical,and Policy Analysis of Preventive Outpatient Treatment, 4 IND. HEALTH L. REV.

361, 385 (2007) (describing publicized crimes which preceded enactment of New York's and
California's IOC statutes).
9 See id. at 371 (suggesting preventative IOC reduces "homelessness, recidivism, incidences
of harmful behaviors, and victimization").
10 See id. at 385 (describing killings precipitating Kendra's Law and Laura's Law); see also
Assisted Outpatient Treatment Laws, supra note 3 (advocating IOC to reduce "violent episodes"
among mentally ill people). But see Henry J. Steadman et al., Violence by People Discharged
from Acute Psychiatric Inpatient Facilities and by Others in the Same Neighborhoods, 55
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 393, 393 (1998) (stating mentally ill people not significantly more

violent than controls).
11 See Henry A. Dlugacz, Involuntary Outpatient Commitment: Some Thoughts on
Promotinga Meaningful Dialogue Between Mental Health Advocates andLawmakers, 53 N.Y.L.

SCH. L. REv. 79, 85-87 (2008-2009) (discussing effect of media coverage on public view of
mental illness). The perception that mentally ill people are prone to violence allows IOC statutes
to be used for "monitoring and treatment" rather than to promote individual well-being, even
when the individual inquestion has no history of violence. Id. at 87; see also Honig & Stefan,
supra note 5, at 112-13 (disputing claim that IOC is required to "contain" mentally ill
individuals).
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a risk of violence fails to serve their needs. 12 To uphold individual
autonomy rights as much as possible in the face of IOC statutes, advocates
for mentally ill individuals must be guided by the client's objectives and
attempt to achieve an outcome that will be acceptable to that client. 3
Part II of this Note examines involuntary outpatient commitment

statutes, with an emphasis on preventative IOC. 14 Part III begins with a
brief examination of the history of involuntary commitment and
treatment. 15 Part III then explores the constitutional issues surrounding
IOC. 16 Next, Part IV-A addresses some of the reported benefits of IOC
statutes as well as the concerns surrounding their use.i? Finally, Part [V-B
analyzes how IOC statutes can be used to obtain the necessary services for
mentally ill clients, and addresses remaining concerns about effectiveness
and patient autonomy. 18

12

See Honig & Stefan, supra note 5, at 119-120 (calling for community-based voluntary

treatment as alternative to IOC); NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, FROM PRIVILEGES TO RIGHTS:
PEOPLE LABELED WITH PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES 6-8 (2000),
available
at
http://www.ncd.gov/rawmedia repository/21553992 2d1 3 4dcb al c4 ee6c9e9434e8?document.
pdf (calling for voluntary mental health system including variety of social services). The
National Council on Disability expressed concern that funding for IOC programs will take money
from already underfunded voluntary treatment programs. Id. at 12; see also Michael Allen &
Vicki Fox Smith, Opening Pandora 's Box: The Practical and Legal Dangers of Involuntary
Outpatient Commitment, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 342, 344 (2001) (expressing concern that
threat of court-ordered medication will deter patients from seeking treatment); Bruce J. Winick et
al., Endorsement of Personal Benefit of Outpatient Commitment Among Persons with Severe
Mental Illness, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 70, 87 (2003) (finding majority of patients held
negative view of IOC both before and after treatment).
13 See Note, The Role of Counsel in the Civil Commitment Process: A Theoretical
Framework, 84 YALE L.J. 1540, 1542-43 (1975) [hereinafter Yale Note] (discussing role of
advocate in civil commitment proceeding). While some attorneys believe that their role in mental
health proceedings is to act as a zealous advocate for their clients, others take the paternalistic
approach of attempting to act in the client's best interests, regardless of the client's input. See
Janet B. Abisch, Mediational Lawyering in the Civil Commitment Context: A Therapeutic
JurisprudenceSolution to the CounselRole Dilemma, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 120, 121-22
(1995) (discussing adversarial and best-interests approaches). However, the Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility state that an attorney should, as much as possible, maintain a normal
attorney-client relationship when dealing with a mentally incapacitated client. MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a) (2009). When appropriate, the attorney can use mediation
techniques to attempt to achieve a result amenable to the client. Henry Chen, Current
Development, The Mediation Approach: Representing Clients with Mental Illness in Civil
Commitment Proceedings, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 599, 610-11 (2006) (discussing use of
mediation in mental health proceedings).
14 See infra Part II (examining various outpatient commitment statutes).
15 See infra Part III (discussing limitations on involuntary treatment).
16 See infra Part III (exploring right to refuse treatment in IOC context).
17 See infra Part IV-A (discussing effect of IOC on patients).
18 See infra Part IV-B (analyzing best uses of IOC along with remaining concerns).
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II.

FACTS

A. Background on Involuntary Outpatient Commitment

The earliest outpatient commitment statutes were passed in the
1950s after government and public opinion began to turn away from the
large-scale institutionalization of mentally ill people. 19 The introduction of
antipsychotic medication to treat the positive symptoms of psychosis, such
as delusions and hallucinations, also aided the shift toward outpatient
treatment.2 z These early laws acted as a form of conditional release for
people who were institutionalized but found to be capable of living in the
community with supervision and treatment .2z Outpatient commitment also
acted as the least restrictive alternative for individuals who met the alreadyexisting standard for involuntary commitment as an inpatient.
Both of
these models use the same legal standard for IOC as they do for inpatient
commitment, meaning that only someone who would otherwise need
hospitalization was subject to court-ordered treatment2 3
In recent years, another form of IOC has developed, known as
preventative outpatient commitment.2 4 Unlike other forms of outpatient

commitment, these laws seek to bring into the state mental health system
those persons who would not otherwise have been subject to involuntary
commitment 7z5 Generally, preventative IOC statutes are enacted with the
hope of preventing future dangerousness among mentally ill people who
19 See Worthington, supra note 2, at 216-17 (describing shift from institutionalization to less
restrictive environments).
20 See Strang, supra note 2, at 250-51 (describing introduction of Thorazine to treat
psychosis).
21 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-263 (2011) (describing criteria for outpatient commitment);
see also Bruce J. Winick et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Outpatient Commitment Law:

Kendra'sLaw as Case Study, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 183, 187-88 (2003) (outlining early
outpatient laws via "paradigmatic" North Carolina statute).
22 See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 80-82
(American Psychological Association 2000) (describing use of outpatient commitment as least
restrictive alternative); Jessica L. MacKeigan Note, Violence, Fear, and Jason 's Law: The
Needless Expansion of Social Control over the Non-Dangerous Mentally Ill in Ohio, 56 CLEV.

L. REv. 739, 744-45 (2008) (discussing various forms of outpatient commitment). This
standard generally requires clear and convincing evidence that the person is a danger to
themselves or others, or that they are gravely disabled to the extent that they are unable to provide
for their own basic needs. See Scherer, supra note 8, at 366.
ST.

23 See PERLIN, supra note 22, at 80-82 (differentiating conditional release and least
restrictive treatment from preventative outpatient commitment).
24 See Scherer, supra note 8, at 362 (introducing concept of preventative 10C).
25 See MacKeigal_ supra note 22, at 745 (stating rationale for preventative outpatient

commitment); see also Scherer, supra note 8, at 382-84 (laying out ideal use of preventative IOC
through hypothetical example).
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are not deemed dangerous by clear and convincing evidence.26 These
statutes also aim to prevent mental illness from deteriorating to the point
when the individual requires hospitalization, by providing treatment to the
person before he or she reaches that point of commitment under traditional
standards.27 In this way, preventative 10C can work as a device to bring
scarce mental health resources to those in the community who need it
most. 28 However, the laws also subject a larger group of people to coerced
29
mental health treatment, thus creating concerns involving civil liberties.
B. Kendra's Law
The paradigmatic preventative IOC statute is New York's Kendra's
Law.
Kendra's Law was passed in 1999 following a publicized incident
in which a mentally ill man, Andrew Goldstein, killed a woman by pushing
her into the path of an oncoming train.3 Doctors had previously diagnosed
Mr. Goldstein with schizophrenia, and he had sought treatment in the
community; however, he had been refused due to insufficient resources.32

26

See Kendra's Law, ch. 408, § 2, 1999 N.Y. Laws 2091 ("The legislature finds that there

are mentally ill persons who are capable of living in the community ... but who, without routine
care and treatment, may relapse and become violent or suicidal .... "); see also Emily S.
Huggins, Note, Assisted OutpatientTreatment: An UnconstitutionalInvasion ofProtectedRights
or a Necessary Government Safeguard?, 30 J. LEGIS. 305, 305 (2004) (describing death of
Kendra Webdale and subsequent enactment of Kendra's Law); Sad But True Tragedies Raise
Visibility,
TREATMENT
ADVOC.
CENTER,
http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/
index.phpoption-com content&task-wiew&id-1720&Itemid-97 (last visited Apr. 20, 2012)
(expressing hope that Gabrielle Giffords's shooting will result in broader involuntary treatment
standards). Some studies have found that IOC had the effect of preventing later criminal conduct.
See Marvin S. Swartz et al., A Randomized Controlled Trial of Outpatient Commitment in North
Carolina, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 325, 327 (2001) (showing effect of IOC on violence);
Henry J. Steadman et al., Assessing the New York City Involuntary Outpatient Commitment Pilot
Program, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 330, 333 (2001) (showing reduced incidence of arrest
among 10C patients). But see Dlugacz, supra note 11, at 85-87 (suggesting media frenzy over
violence prevention obscures efforts to address needs of mentally ill people).
27 See E. Fuller Torrey & Mary Zdanowicz, Outpatient Commitment What, Why and for
Whom 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 337, 337 (2001) (suggesting IOC necessary because mentally
ill people lack awareness of their illness); see also Scherer, supra note 8, at 367 (suggesting
preventative 10C improves social welfare by providing treatment to nonviolent mentally ill
people).
28 See Worthington, supra note 2, at 238-39 (suggesting Kendra's Law allows New York
to
"concentrat[e] resources on the most needy").
29 See Winick et al., supra note 21, at 200-01 (questioning how Kendra's Law impacts
patient's right to refuse medication).
30 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (Consol. Supp. 2012).
31 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 1 (describing circumstances of passing law).
32 See Dlugacz, supra note 11, at 80 & n.3 (providing further description of circumstances of
killing).
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Kendra's Law allows the court to order any individual meeting its
requirements to comply with case management and a treatment plan that
commonly involves medication.33
Individuals are subject to court-mandated treatment under Kendra's
Law if they meet seven eligibility requirements.34

These requirements

include that the person must be eighteen years of age or older and be
diagnosed with a mental illness.3 5 He or she must be "unlikely to survive
safely in the community without supervision," as determined by the
interviewing psychiatrist.3 6 He or she must have a history of lack of
compliance with treatment, which has resulted either in two or more
hospitalizations within the last thirty-six months, or in one or more acts or
threats of violence within the past forty-eight months.37 He or she must be
"unlikely to voluntarily participate in outpatient treatment., 38 Finally, the
person must be in need of outpatient treatment to prevent a "relapse or
deterioration," and must be likely to benefit from outpatient treatment.39
However, no finding of incompetency to make treatment decisions is
necessary to subject a person to a court order, and a Kendra's Law
order is
40
incompetency.
determine
to
used
being
from
explicitly prohibited
Any of a variety of parties can file a petition to initiate proceedings
under Kendra's Law, including anyone living with the mentally ill person,
an immediate family member of the mentally ill person, or a treating
psychiatrist or psychologist. 41
Additionally, the petition must be
accompanied by an affidavit of a physician who has examined the person
or has been unable to complete the examination due to lack of
cooperation.42 After the court receives the petition, it must conduct a
hearing within three days.43 If the person who is the subject of the petition
fails to attend the hearing, the court may conduct the hearing and issue the
33 See MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(a)(1) (requiring case management and providing variety of

possible treatment services).
34 Id. § 9.60(c)(1)-(7).
31 Id. § 9.60(c)(1)-(2).
36

Id. § 9.60(c)(3). The use of the word "unlikely" provides little objective meaning, giving

the interviewing psychiatrist great latitude to decide whether or not the criterion is met. See
Jennifer Guttenan, Note, Waging a War on Drugs: Administering a Lethal Dose to Kendra's
Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2401, 2437 (2000) (analyzing implications of "unlikely").
37 MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(c)(4)(i)-(ii).
31 Id. § 9.60(c)(5).
39 Id. § 9.60(c)(6)-(7).
40 Id. § 9.60(o); see also Gutterman, supra note 36, at 2414 (asserting controversy over lack
of incompetency requirement).
41 See MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(e)(1)(i)-(viii).
42 Id. § 9.60(e)(3)(i)-(ii).
43 Id. § 9.60(h)(1).
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order in the subject's absence.44 Finally, the statute grants the person who
is the subject of the petition a right to counsel.45
If the court determines that the person meets the criteria for IOC, it
issues an order mandating compliance with the examining physician's
written treatment plan.46 The subject of the petition and his or her treating
physician must be given the opportunity to participate in the process of
creating the treatment plan. 47 The court does not have the authority to
order treatment that deviates from the written plan. 48 The initial order lasts
for six months, and can be extended for periods of one year at a time. 49 A
person who violates the order, for example, by declining to take medication
as ordered in the treatment plan, can be removed to a hospital and detained
for up to seventy-two hours for observation. 50 Any longer period of
detention must comply with standard involuntary commitment procedures,
51
and non-compliance with the order is not itself grounds for commitment.
C. OtherPreventativeIOC Statutes
The first state to enact a preventative outpatient commitment
statute was North Carolina in 1983.52 North Carolina's statute allows any
person to appear before a magistrate and petition the court to take a
mentally ill individual into custody for examination. 53 For such an order to
issue, the court must find that the mentally ill individual is dangerous to
others, dangerous to himself or herself, or requires treatment to prevent
"deterioration that would predictably result in dangerousness . 5 4 The
examining physician may recommend inpatient or outpatient treatment; if
44 Id. The ability to conduct ex parte hearings raises concerns about the ability of certain
people to defend their rights in court, such as homeless people, who may be difficult to serve with
process within the three day period. See Winick et al., supra note 21, at 197-98 (discussing
implications of hearings in absentia).
45 MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(g).
46 Id. § 9.60(i).
47 Id. The law also allows the subject of the petition to include a significant person, such as a

relative or close friend, in the proceedings. Id.
48 Id.
Id. § 9.600)(2), (k).
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(n) (Consol. Supp. 2012).
51 Id.; see also In re K.L., 806 N.E.2d 480, 485 (N.Y. 2004) ("[T]he coercive force of the
49

50

order lies solely in the compulsion generally felt by law-abiding citizens to comply with court
directives."); infra Part III (describing how court held Kendra's Law not to constitute forced
medication).
52 See Winick et al., supra note 21, at 187-88 (describing North Carolina law as
"paradigmatic" outpatient commitment statute); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-271 (2011).
" § 122C-261.
54 id.
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outpatient treatment is recommended, the court must hold a hearing to
determine whether the individual will be subject to IOC. 5 For the court to
order IOC, the subject must be mentally ill, capable of surviving safely in
the community with supervision, in need of treatment to prevent
deterioration that would result in dangerousness, and the individual's
mental illness must limit his or her ability to accept voluntary treatment.56
Because the person subjected to the petition is taken into custody, North
Carolina's law allows a more immediate intrusion into a subject's civil
liberty interests than Kendra's Law; however, because the criteria require
dangerousness rather than merely
"deterioration," it ultimately covers a
57
more limited group of people.
In contrast, California's IOC statute, known as Laura's Law and
enacted in 2002, is largely based on Kendra's Law. 58 The statute includes
the seven eligibility criteria set out in Kendra's Law and adds two
additional criteria: first, the person's condition must be "substantially
deteriorating," and, second, the IOC must be the least restrictive placement
necessary for the person.59 In addition, only the county mental health
director may file a petition.60 Counties enact Laura's Law on an opt-in
basis, and
each adopting county must provide on its own the required
61
funding.

55 id.
56

id.

5' See id. § 122C-263(d) (stating determinations on which commitment is based); Strang,
supra note 2, at 261-62 (outlining requirements for North Carolina IOC statute); cf N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(c)(6) (Consol. Supp. 2012) (stating individual must need IOC "in
order to prevent a relapse or deterioration").
58 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5345-5349.5 (West 2010); MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60;
see also Scherer, supra note 8, at 393 (describing derivation of Laura's Law fromKendra's Law).
California passed Laura's Law after Scott Thorpe, a man with delusional paranoia, killed Laura
Wilcox. See Editorial, Carry Out "Laura'sLaw," S.F. CHRON., Mar. 21, 2006, at B6.
59 WELF. & INST. CODE § 5346(a)(6)-(7).
60 Id. § 5346(b)(1). Individuals who would be able to file a petition under Kendra's Law are
instead allowed to request a petition under Laura's Law. Id. § 5346(b)(2).
61 See Scherer, supra note 8, at 419 (outlining opt-in system for Laura's Law). Perhaps due
to funding problems, only Los Angeles County has attempted to adopt Laura's Law. See id. at
421-22. However, Los Angeles County did not adopt the full provisions of the law, but instead
enacted a limited pilot program for people already in the criminal justice system. Id. at 422; see
also In re Arden Hill Hosp., 703 N.Y.S.2d 902, 906 (Sup. Ct. 2000) (holding county bears cost of
outpatient commitment under Kendra's Law).
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III. HISTORY
A. Background
The state may compel the treatment of mentally ill individuals
under the principle of parens patriae and the state's police powers.62 The

police power interest allows a state to provide involuntary treatment-such
as commitment to a mental hospital-when it is necessary to protect the
safety of the public.63 However, justifying forced treatment under the
police power requires, at a minimum, that the subject be dangerous.64
Parenspatriae allows the state to act in the best interests of a person who is
unable to make decisions on his or her own behalf65 Therefore, a finding
of incompetency is generally necessary in order for parens patriae to be

invoked.6 6 In most jurisdictions, even a person who meets the standard for
involuntary commitment as an inpatient is presumed to be competent to

make treatment decisions.6 7 The state interest in involuntary outpatient
commitment is near the edges of the two spheres of either the police power
or the parens patriae interest. 6
However, because the United States

62

See Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to "JustSay No ": A History andAnalysis of the Right to

Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REV. 283, 336-38 (1992) (identifying sources of
government power); MacKeigan, supra note 22, at 744 (outlining uses of state's police power and
parenspatriae interests).
63 See Cichon, supra note 62, at 337-39 (describing foundation of police power interest in
involuntary treatment). This interest includes preventing a mentally ill person from harming himor herself. Id.
64 See id. (justifying forced treatment to prevent harm to individual or community); see also
Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 935 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (holding forced medication under
police power requires that patient is "presently violent or self-destructive"); In re Orr, 531 N.E.2d
64, 73 (111. App. Ct. 1988) (holding individual may refuse treatment unless immediate threat of
harm to self or others); Rogers v. Comm'r of Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 323
(Mass. 1983) ("In a nonemergency situation, no State interest is sufficiently compelling to
overcome a patient's decision to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs.").
65 See MacKeigan supra note 22, at 744 (outlining state police power).
66 See Cichon, supra note 62, at 345 (setting out requirement for invocation of parenspatriae
authority).
67 See Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 314 (stating committed patient must be found incompetent by
judge to force medication); Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 148-49 & n.7 (Minn. 1988)
(holding separate finding of incompetency must be made before forced medication of committed
patient); see also Cichon, supra note 62, at 350 n.435 (citing numerous cases suggesting
committed patient not necessarily incompetent).
68 See MacKeigan supra note 22, at 755-56 (examining state interest in proposed Ohio IOC
statute). The state's police power is tenuous because preventative IOC deals with only those
people who are not currently dangerous but at most may become dangerous in the future. See
Huggins, supra note 26, at 320 (arguing Kendra's Law is "preventive measure" not within police
power). The parens patriae justification is similarly weak because preventative IOC does not
require a finding of incompetence. See Guttennan supra note 36, at 2436-37 (suggesting
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Supreme Court has done little to specify what due process protections
should be afforded in the mental health context, the practical extent of
those interests is largely left to each individual state to determine.6 9
In Washington v. Harper,70 the Court found that an individual has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding involuntary
psychiatric medication. 71 However, this right is not absolute, and the
procedural protections required to protect the right vary by context
according to the government interest implicated by the person's refusal.72
Although the decision in Harperupheld the prison policies in question, the
court indicated that stronger
procedural protections were required outside
73
of the prison context.
Somewhat more relevant is the Court's decision in Riggins v.

Nevada.74

Riggins involved the right of a pre-trial detainee to refuse

medication during the period of trial. 75 Though the Court did not establish

a specific standard for states to follow in providing due process, it
suggested

that,

if the treatment

was

"medically

appropriate

and,

considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for [petitioner's] own
safety or the safety of others," it would meet due process standards.76
Individuals outside the criminal context are entitled to at least the due

process protections retained by pre-trial detainees. 77

Kendra's Law is outside of parenspatriaebecause no finding of incompetence required).
69 See Guttennan, supra note 36, at 2418 (explaining varying extent of due process rights by
state); see also infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text (outlining Supreme Court decisions on
involuntary medication).
70 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
71 Id. at 221-22 ("[R]espondent possesses a significant liberty interest in avoiding the
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
72 See id. at 226 (describing context for refusal of medication). The respondent in Harper
was a prisoner, and the Court determined that in the prison context, review by a second
psychiatrist sufficiently protected the respondent's due process interest. Id. at 222-23. Because
of the strength and legitimacy of the state's interest in prison regulation, the Court reviews due
process protections of prisoners' constitutional rights at a more lenient standard than outside the
prison context. Id. at 223. Therefore, the substance of the Harper ruling on procedural due
process is unlikely to apply outside the prison system. See id.
71 See id. at 223 ("[T]he State under other circumstances would have been required to satisfy
a more rigorous standard of review."); see also Cichon, supra note 62, at 416-17 (analyzing
Harper as applied to right to refuse medication among general population).
74 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
71 Id. at 129-31. The petitioner did not need the medication to be competent to stand trial.
Id. at 130. The Court found that the due process protection review of the prescription by three
court-ordered physicians, was not sufficient to protect the petitioner's interest in refusing the
drugs. Id. at 129.
76 Id. at 135.
77 See Cichon, supra note 62, at 419-20 (suggesting three-tier system for due process right to
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States can provide for a higher level of due process protections
79
7
For example, in Rivers v. Kat,
own mental health system.
their
within
the New York Court of Appeals held that under the state constitution, the
ability of an institutionalized person to refuse medication was a
fundamental right.8 0 In order for the state's police power to justify forced

medication, there must be an emergency which creates a compelling state
interest, and medication is justified only for the duration of the
emergency."' Forced medication under a state's parens patriae interest is
justified only by a finding that the person is incompetent to make his or her
own treatment decisions.8 2 Without a finding of incompetency, however,
the parens patriae interest cannot apply-the state has no interest
in
83

substituting its treatment decisions for those of a competent person.

B. Decisions on Involuntary Outpatient Commitment
New York courts have consistently upheld the constitutionality of
Kendra's Law, despite the protections provided in Rivers .4 The first
challenge to Kendra's Law asserted due process and equal protection
violations, arguing that under Rivers, the law required a finding of

incapacity to subject a patient to outpatient commitment.8 5 The court held
drug refusal); see also Harper, 494 U.S. at 223 (stating civil setting required "more rigorous"
review).
78 See Rogers v. Comm'r of Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 314 (Mass. 1983)
(finding no state interest sufficient to force medication outside of emergency); Rivers v. Katz, 495
N.E.2d 337, 341 (N.Y. 1986) (finding right to refuse medication fundamental under New York
State Constitution);.
79 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986).
80 Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 344 (holding that right to refuse is fundamental).
81 See id. at 342-43 (suggesting level of immediate dangerousness required to create
compelling state interest).
82 See id. at 343 (setting out level of review required to invoke parenspatriae interest). A
finding of incompetency must be proved by clear and convincing evidence at a separate judicial
hearing. Id. at 344. An individual is not incompetent by virtue of being mentally ill or
institutionalized. Id.; see also Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment
Competence Study III: Abilities ofPatients to Consent to Psychiatric andMedical Treatments, 19
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 149, 169 (1995) (finding mentally ill people made decisions with similar
competence to people without mental illness).
83 See Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 343 (emphasizing grounds behindparenspatriaeinterest).
84 See In re K.L., 806 N.E.2d 480, 484 (N.Y. 2004) (holding incompetency not required
because law does not authorize forced medication); In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d 862, 873 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2000) (holding no finding of incompetency necessary for IOC order); see also Rivers,
495 N.E.2d at 344 (stating fundamental right to refuse medication).
85 See In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 865 (setting out plaintiffs' constitutional claims); see
also Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 657 (1st Cir. 1980) ("[T]he individual himself must be
incapable of making a competent decision concerning treatment [for state to force medication
under parenspatriae].").
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that Kendra's Law was not subject to a Rivers analysis because a courtordered treatment plan involving medication did not constitute forced
medication.86 It reasoned that because the law requires a person to have the
opportunity to participate in creating their own treatment plan, the
legislature anticipated that the law applied only to people competent to
make treatment decisions.87
The court also rejected the plaintiffs'
additional arguments on summary arrest and equal protection.88
In In re K.L.,89 the New York Court of Appeals again declared that
Kendra's Law did not violate any constitutional interest. 90 The respondent
was under a Kendra's Law order requiring him to self-administer
antipsychotics, or otherwise submit to intravenous administration. 91
Similarly, this respondent argued that Kendra's Law required a judicial
finding of incompetency in order to comply with constitutional
requirements.92 Again, the New York Court of Appeals held that Rivers
did not apply to Kendra's Law because the law "does not permit forced
medical treatment." 93 The In re K.L. court suggested that the state's police
power interest is more compelling when individuals are in the community,
because they present a greater danger if they were to become violent than
people under inpatient commitment.9 4 In addition, the court claimed that
86 See In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 868-69 (justifying court-ordered medication for
outpatients as not forced).
17 See id. at 868 (inferring legislative intent that Kendra's Law apply to competent

individuals). The court surmised that the judge would not grant an IOC order if the individual
had not had the opportunity to meaningfully participate in the treatment plan. Id.
88 See id. at 873 (holding Kendra's Law constitutional). The seventy-two hour evaluation
period for non-compliant individuals did not constitute "summary arrest," as argued by the
plaintiffs, but rather, arose from the state's compelling interest in ensuring that the individual,
while not medicated, did not need involuntary commitment. Id. at 868. If the individual were
placed in inpatient commitment, Rivers would protect them against forced medication. See
Worthington, supra note 2, at 231 (analyzing constitutional consequences of seventy-two hour
detention). The court similarly rejected the equal protection challenge on grounds that because
the court order did not constitute forced medication, the state did not violate a fundamental right
of the subject. In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 872-73.
89 806 N.E.2d 480 (N.Y. 2004).
90 Id. at 486 (holding IOC proceedings under Kendra's Law satisfy due process).
91 Id. at 482 (setting out facts of case). The respondent had schizoaffective disorder, bipolar
type, and a history of hospitalization. Id. In addition to medication, the treatment order required
him to undergo case management, therapy, and blood testing. Id.
92 See id. at 483-84 (stating respondent's constitutional claims).
93 Id. at 484. The court relied on the lack of coercive punishment available for those who fail
to comply with a Kendra's Law order. See id. at 485 ("[T]he coercive force of the order lies
solely in the compulsion generally felt by law-abiding citizens to comply with court directives.").
Kendra's Law does not allow a person to be held in contempt for failing to comply with the court
order, nor can that person be subject to involuntary commitment on those grounds. N.Y. MENTAL
HYG. LAW § 9.60(n) (Consol. Supp. 2012).
94 See In re K.L., 806 N.E.2d at 485-86 (suggesting heightened state police power interest in
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the state has a parenspatriae interest in treating an individual person to a

Kendra's Law order because those subject to the law's purview
are
95

"unlikely to survive safely in the community" without treatment.
Although Kendra's Law appears for the moment to be firmly in
place in New York, preventative IOC has been successfully challenged
elsewhere. 96 In Protectionand Advocacy System v. City ofAlbuquerque, 7
the New Mexico Court of Appeals struck down a city ordinance modeled
after Kendra's Law. 98 While the court did not decide the case on due
process grounds, it nevertheless struck the law down, finding that the state
mental health code preempted the ordinance, which stated that "[n]o
psychotropic medication . . . shall be administered to any client without
proper consent." 99 Unlike in In re K.L., the court held that a court order
issued under the ordinance constituted the administration of medication
without consent. 100 In fact, the court specifically declined to harmonize its
reasoning with that of In re K.L., stating that "the coercive nature of a court
order requiring treatment would clearly allow an act contrary to the
statute's mandate that an individual's consent be obtained." 1 1 Although In
re K.L. remains a strong sanction for Kendra's Law, not all jurisdictions
agree that court-ordered medication does not constitute involuntary

treatment. 102

individuals outside of institutions); see also Scherer, supra note 8, at 405 (arguing individuals in
community subject to reduced due process scrutiny). Scherer suggests that once "the state has
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is severely mentally ill," the burden
should shift to the individual to show that the treatment is not related to a legitimate state interest.
Id.But see Gutterman- supra note 36, at 2422 (suggesting individuals in community not deemed
dangerous or incompetent should receive heightened standard of review).
95 See In re K.L., 806 N.E.2d at 486 (asserting parenspatriae interest in treating patients
under Kendra's Law). This expanded state interest appears to lower the standard required in
Rivers, which stated explicitly that the state has no parenspatriae interest in making treatment
decisions for a competent individual. See Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 343 (N.Y. 1986)
(stating grounds for parenspatriae interest in taking care of people unable to make decisions).
As in In re Urcuyo, the court in In re K.L. found that the seventy-two-hour detention was justified
by a compelling state interest in monitoring a mentally ill person with a potentially deteriorating
condition. In re K.L., 806 N.E.2d at 487; In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d 862, 873 (Sup. Ct. 2000).
96 See Prot. & Advocacy Sys. v. City of Albuquerque, 195 P.3d 1, 4 (N.M. Ct. App.
2008)
(affirming permanent injunction against ordinance).
97 195 P.3d 1 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008).
98 Id.at 4-7 (detailing provisions of ordinance).
99 See id.at 18, 20 (holding informed consent provision in state mental health code
preempted ordinance).
100 See id.
at 19-20 (analyzing ordinance for preemption).
101 Id. at 21.
102

See Prot. & Advocacy Sys., 195 P.3d at 20 (finding court-ordered compliance with

treatment plan constitutes medicating without consent).
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IV-A. POLICY ISSUES SURROUNDING
INVOLUNTARY OUTPATIENT COMMITMENT
Supporters of IOC commonly refer to the statutes' ability to

prevent violence. 103

Preventative IOC statutes are often passed after a

mentally ill person has committed a high-profile violent crime as a bid to
prevent further violence .4 One study of the North Carolina outpatient
commitment program found that long-term IOC reduced the incidence of
further violence in patients who had an existing history of violence. 05
Although the New York State report on Kendra's Law did not specifically
track violent acts, it did report major decreases in the incidence of arrest
and incarceration among IOC recipients. 6
While this framing technique is effective at rallying public support
for preventative IOC laws, relying on media portrayals of dangerous
psychotics committing random acts of violence confuses the issues
surrounding access to effective treatment and the autonomy of mentally ill
individuals. 7 Contrary to widespread public perception, clinical research
shows that mentally ill people are not more likely to commit acts of

103

See Huggins, supra note 26, at 305 ("Kendra Webdale never saw it coming."); Scherer,

supra note 8, at 367 (suggesting Virginia Tech massacre caused by lack of coercive treatment).
104 See Dlugacz, supra note 11, at 85 (suggesting relationship between media portrayals of
dangerousness and enactment of Kendra's Law). The New York Legislature passed Kendra's
Law in a "media frenzy" after Andrew Goldstein, a man with untreated schizophrenia, pushed
Kendra Webdale in front of a subway train, resulting in her death. Worthington supra note 2, at
221. California passed Laura's Law after Scott Thorpe, a patient at a public mental health clinic,
shot and killed Laura Wilcox, a receptionist at the clinic. See Carry out "Laura'sLaw," supra
note 58. Similarly, Michigan enacted "Kevin's Law" after a man with schizophrenia beat to
death college student Kevin Heisinger. See Scherer, supra note 8, at 397 n.188.
105 See Swartz et al., supra note 26, at 327 (describing effect of IOC on incidence of
violence). The study measured violence through reports by the patients and their case managers
and included acts or threats of violence. Id. Other major factors in violent behavior were
substance abuse and infrequent contact with mental health services. Id.
106 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 17-18 (reporting data on incidence of arrest and
incarceration among IOC patients). The state reported an eighty-three percent reduction in rates
of arrest and an eighty-seven percent reduction in rates of incarceration for patients under an IOC
order. Id. However, this data does not track the crimes precipitating the prior arrests and
incarceration, and includes only non-violent crime. Id. In a study of the New York City IOC
pilot program conducted prior to Kendra's Law, there were no arrests for violence against a
person. Steadman et al., supra note 26, at 333 (detailing incidence of arrest among IOC group
and control group).
107 See Dlugacz, supra note 11, at 85-87 (assessing effect of media portrayals on debate over
Kendra's Law). For example, Andrew Goldstein, Kendra Webdale's killer, voluntarily attempted
to seek treatment, only to be turned away. Id. at 85. The media largely ignored that fact. Id.; see
also NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 12, at 10 ("Misconceptions about dangerousness
are among the justifications that allow the maltreatment and abuse of people with psychiatric
disabilities.").
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violence than members of the general population.' 8 Furthermore, doctors
cannot predict with accuracy which individuals are "dangerous," let alone
identify individuals fitting the vaguer standard for preventative 10C; that is,
individuals who are likely to deteriorate and become dangerous.109 Finally,
individuals deemed dangerous to themselves or others are already eligible
for involuntary commitment as an inpatient."10 Because IOC laws exist
expressly to provide involuntary treatment to patients who are not
considered dangerous, protection of the public cannot be considered a main
justification for these laws. 1
A more compelling justification for the use of IOC is the
possibility of positive therapeutic outcomes for patients under a court
order.1 2 The New York State report on Kendra's Law found that patients'
adherence to medication improved significantly, and found moderate
improvement in a variety of measures of social functioning.113 In the long
term, it found that patients subject to a Kendra's Law order experienced
significantly reduced instances of psychiatric hospitalization and
homelessness . 4 The North Carolina study also found some link between
108 See Steadman et al., supra note 10, at 393 (finding no significant difference in rates of
violence between mentally ill and control group). The strongest indicator of further violence
found in the study was substance abuse. Id.; see also Honig & Stefan, supra note 5, at 112-13
(showing no causal link between mental illness and violence); Scherer, supra note 8, at 377
("[C]ontrary to popular belief, many scientific studies have struggled to find a concrete link
between violence and severe mental illness.").
109 See Worthington, supra note 2, at 239 (citing difficulty of predicting future acts of
violence). Worthington suggests that testifying physicians, concerned about the possibility of
litigation if a patient who is released commits a violent crime, will tend to overestimate the
incidence of dangerousness, allowing individuals to be subject to IOC who do not fit a closer
reading of the criteria. Id.; see also PERLIN, supra note 22, at 80-82 (describing vagueness
inherent in prediction of dangerousness).
110 See Cichon, supra note 62, at 337 (citing standard of dangerousness in civil commitment
proceedings); PERHN, supra note 22, at 82 ("[S]tate and federal courts have unanimously found
dangerousness to be a predicate to a constitutionally valid commitment.").
In many
circumstances, the dangerous patient is subject to being involuntarily medicated once committed.
Cichon, supra note 62, at 337-39.
111 See Gutterman, supra note 36, at 2435-37 (finding preventative IOC not justified by
police power because it covers non-dangerous people); MacKeigan, supra note 22, at 751-52
(suggesting IOC based on "speculative risk assessments" rather than dangerousness not justified
by police power).
112 See Scherer, supra note 8, at 371 (listing statistical positive effects of Kendra's Law).
113 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 12 (charfing improvements in medication adherence
and social functioning). But see PERLIN, supra note 22, at 94 (casting doubt on medication
compliance per se as evidence of social functioning in inpatient context). Courts should not use
the fact of whether or not an individual complies with medication to substitute for a determination
of the individual's competence to make treatment decisions or level of social functioning. Id. at
94-95.
114 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 17-18 (reporting 77% decrease in hospitalizations
and 74% decrease in homelessness). However, the study of the New York City IOC pilot
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IOC and reduced hospitalizations, particularly for long-term patients.1 5
While the ability to receive treatment in the community benefits mentally
ill people, the question remains whether involuntary outpatient
commitment is the most effective way to provide that treatment. 116
By its very nature, IOC intrudes on the autonomy of the mentally
ill individual."17 In In re KL. and other related cases addressing the issue
under Kendra's Law, courts have held that the intrusion is not sufficiently
great to overcome the government's interest in treating mentally ill people
before their condition may deteriorate." 8 However, the fact remains that
preventative IOC, by definition, encompasses individuals who are
competent to make decisions about their treatment.1 1 9 Furthermore, even
the majority of those individuals deemed seriously mentally ill display the
same decision-making competence as mentally healthy people.120 As much
as possible, such people should retain the right to participate in their own
treatment decisions. 121

program found no significant difference in hospitalizations or homelessness between the group
receiving IOC and a control group receiving enhanced voluntary services. Steadman et al., supra
note 26, at 333-34.
115 See Swartz et al., supra note 26, at 327 (summarizing data on hospital readmissions).
Frequency of contact with services was also a significant factor in reduced hospitalizations. Id.
116 See Winick et al., supra note 21, at 190-91 (sumnmarizing therapeutic benefits
and
drawbacks of 10C). Studies have found that IOC has some success at reducing subsequent
hospitalizations, but that the success largely depends on the commitment of treatment resources to
the program. Id. at 190. IOC also presents a risk of undermining the relationship between doctor
and patient due to the threat of coerion. Id. at 191.
117 See Gutterman, supra note 36, at 2434-35 (describing civil libertarian opposition to
Kendra's Law). Court-ordered medication intrudes on the individual right to determine medical
treatment, and the medication itself influences the individual's thought processes. Id.
118 See In re K.L., 806 N.E.2d 480, 484 (N.Y. 2004) (holding Kendra's Law does not
constitute forced medication); supra Part III (describing constitutional decisions on 10C). But see
O'Connor, supra note 7, at 347 (claiming "the issue is one of semantics" between forced
medication and court-ordered medication).
119 See Gutterman supra note 36, at 2436 (citing lack of incompetency requirement as
argument against Kendra's Law); see also Winick et al., supra note 21, at 193 (suggesting IOC
debate in practice assumes incompetence of mentally ill people).
120 See Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 82, at 169 ("[T]he majority of patients with
schizophrenia did not perform more poorly than other patients and nonpatients."). Although a
minority of patients with schizophrenia showed substantial decision-making impairment, most
were as competent as those in the control group. Id.; see also Winick et al., supra note 21, at
193-94 (discussing legal ramifications of de facto assumption of incompetency).
121 See O'Connor,supra note 7, at 347-48 (criticizing lack of protection under Kendra's Law
for patient decision-making). Kendra's Law requires that the respondent have "an opportunity to
actively participate in the development of [the treatment] plan." Id. at 348 (quoting N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(i)(2) (Consol. Supp. 2012)). However, the law provides no guidance
on how to accomplish this, leaving the patient with no real decision-making leverage if the doctor
creating the plan is opposed to the patient's input. Id.; see also Strang, supra note 2, at 275

(outlining proposal to require formal meeting for discussion of treatment plan).
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The individual's right to participate in his or her own treatment
decisions becomes even more vital when considering the side effects of
commonly-used psychiatric medications, particularly antipsychotics, which
are the main component of most IOC orders. 2 2 One particularly severe
side effect is tardive dyskinesia, which is characterized by uncontrollable
repetitive movements. 123 Tardive dyskinesia is of particular concern
because it is usually irreversible, even when the medication is
discontinued. 124 Furthermore, not all patients benefit from antipsychotic
medication. 25 Finally, even when antipsychotic medications work well,
they do not treat all of the symptoms of schizophrenia. 26 While
antipsychotic medications can reduce symptoms in many patients, a
patient's decision not to use antipsychotic medication may have more to do
with the patient's rational weighing of the options than a symptom of the
mental illness. 27
Ultimately, one of the most important clinical benefits of
involuntary outpatient commitment may be the promise of additional
funding for treatment that such a program brings. 28 For example, New
York devoted $32 million dollars a year in funding to support programs
under Kendra's Law, and each Kendra's Law patient is guaranteed
individual case management. 129 Furthermore, New York courts have held
30

that counties are required to finance the cost of court-ordered treatment.

122

See Cichon, supra note 62, at 297 (discussing side effects of antipsychotic medication).

Antipsychotic medications can cause a variety of effects on the nervous system, including
parkinsonism, akinesia (a state of reduced spontaneous mobility combined with extreme apathy),
and akathisia (a state of constant agitation and involuntary movement). Id. at 300-02. These side
effects typically go away when treatment is discontinued, but can be unbearable while they
continue. Id.
123 See id. at 304-05 (describing symptoms of tardive dyskinesia).
The effects are often
concentrated in the face, tongue, and mouth, but in serious cases can cause difficulty with
breathing. Id. Even mild symptoms are obvious and can be socially debilitating. Id.
124 See id.at 305 (stating irreversibility of tardive dyskinesia). Estimates of the prevalence of
tardive dyskinesia range from between ten and twenty percent to up to fifty
-five percent of longterm patients. Id.at 306.
125 See id. at 295-96 (describing lack of efficacy of antipsychotic drugs in some cases). As
many as fifty percent of patients with chronic schizophrenia, and even some with acute
schizophrenia, may derive no benefit from the drugs. Id.
126 See id. at 294 (describing limits on effectiveness of antipsychotics).
127 See Honig & Stefan, supra note 5, at 116 ("[A] decision to refuse treatment with antipsychotics.., might represent a sound medical decision.").
128 See Dlugacz, supra note 11, at 92 (advocating use of IOC statutes to secure services for
clients).
129

See FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2 (reporting funding allotments for provision of

Kendra's Law services).
130 See In re Arden Hill Hosp., 703 N.Y.S.2d 902, 907 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000) (holding cost of
treatment under Kendra's Law to be borne by county). But see Scherer, supra note 8, at 420
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Because a patient who meets the criteria for an outpatient commitment
order is likely to be in need of some form of treatment, advocates could use
outpatient commitment
laws to ensure that treatment is provided to those
131

who need it most.

Finally, in the debate over outpatient commitment, more attention
should be given to the experiences of patients who have been subject to
court-ordered treatment. 3 2 The New York State report on Kendra's Law
found that sixty-two percent of patients considered their court-ordered
treatment a good thing overall. 3 3 However, an independent study of
patients' perceptions of IOC found that while roughly half of patients were
optimistic about the program going in, only 27.6% felt that it had benefited
them personally after one year of treatment. 34 People who expressed a
positive perception of the treatment order at the beginning of the study
were more likely to have beneficial treatment outcomes, suggesting that
positive patient involvement is therapeutically beneficial even in the

involuntary context. 3 Among patients who reported a strong subjective
feeling of coercion, positive treatment outcomes were associated with
positive endorsement of IOC, while negative outcomes caused strongly
negative assessments. 36
The debate over involuntary outpatient

(outlining California counties' responsibility to fund Laura's Law). The requirement that each
county provide its own funding for California's Laura's Law has led only one county to adopt it,
and on a limited basis only. Id. at 421-22.
131 See Dlugacz, supra note 11, at 92-93 (suggesting advocate's role is to ensure IOC
recipient receives most appropriate services); Worthington, supra note 2, at 238-39 (observing
that Kendra's Law concentrates resources on most needy clients). However, some advocates are
concerned that IOC will divert funding from voluntary mental health programs. See Allen &
Smith, supra note 12, at 344 ("Every dollar prioritized for coerced treatment is a dollar that is not
available to pay for effective voluntary services .... "); Worthington, supra note 2, at 238
(expressing concerns of Kendra's Law critics);. Both voluntary and involuntary patients will
benefit from a better-funded mental health system capable of more cohesive services. Swartz et
al., supra note 26, at 329 (finding therapeutic benefits gained through availability of intensive
treatment); Torrey & Zdanowicz, supra note 27, at 340 (suggesting IOC will increase available
funds by decreasing amount expended on inpatient hospitalizations).
132 See Honig & Stefan supra note 5, at 117-18 (citing sparse research on patient
experiences with OC).
133 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 20 (describing experiences of Kendra's Law
patients). Even higher percentages of patients reported some benefit from court orders; for
example, eighty-one percent felt that it had "helped them get and stay well." Id. at 21.
134 See Winick et al., supra note 12, at 78 (stating overall results of study). People who felt
positively at the beginning of the study were also more likely to endorse IOC at the end of the
study. Id. at 80-81. Predictably, people who experienced a positive result from treatment were
more likely to report personal benefit. Id. at 79-80.
135 See id at 79-81 (suggesting patients' positive baseline approach to IOC contributed to
better response to treatment).
136 See id at 73 (finding patients' experience of high degree of coercion polarized attitudes
towards OC).
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commitment should include these measures of patients' experiences of
IOC, and attention should be
paid to how individual patients describe the
37

effect of IOC on their lives.1
IV-B.

IMPLICATIONS FOR ADVOCACY

Attorneys representing mentally ill clients have struggled for some
time to define their role in the proceedings. 38 Some attorneys maintain the
standard adversarial role, advocating for their client's stated interests
regardless of the predicted mental health outcomes.' 39 Others take a
paternalistic approach of advocating for what they consider to be in their

client's best interests, even if it goes against the client's expressed
wishes. 40

Because people who are eligible for preventative outpatient

commitment are, by definition, competent to make their own treatment
decisions, lawyers in the IOC context should act as much as possible
according to their client's stated goals. 14 1 This is particularly so given the
therapeutic benefits to the client in participating in his or her own treatment
process. 142

However, the attorney can play an important role in mediating
between the mentally ill client and the party proposing involuntary

137

See Honig & Stefan, supra note 5, at 120-21 (suggesting studies of IOC should evaluate

subjective impact of IOC on patient); see also NAT'L

COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 12, at
9 (arguing for self-determination and consumer direction in mental health services).
138 See Abisch, supra note 13, at 120-22 (discussing adversarial and best-interests

approaches to representation); Yale Note, supra note 13, at 1542-43 (outlining potential roles for
advocate in civil commitment proceeding).
139 See Yale Note, supra note 13, at 1554-55 (arguing lawyers for mentally ill clients
should
take adversarial role in civil commitment process). As in other areas of the legal system, the
adversarial model is premised on the idea that the competing interests of each side will produce a
result closest to the truth. Id.
140 See Abisch, supra note 13, at 129-31 (detailing argument that attorney should act in
client's best interests to ensure beneficial treatment). The pitfall of this position is that a lawyer
attempting to act in the best interests of his client may simply follow the word of doctors and
hospital administrators, and, thus, fail to consider the individualized situation of the client. See
id at 131.
141 See Dlugacz, supra note 11, at 92 (suggesting role for attorney as advocate
in IOC
proceedings). The Model Rules of Professional Conduct state that when representing a client
with a mental impairment, the attorney should maintain a normal attorney-client relationship as

much as possible.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT

R. 1.14(a) (2009). In the context of a

client who is competent to make treatment decisions, this entails advocating for the goals chosen
by the client. See Abisch, supra note 13, at 139 (setting out obligation of attorney under Model
Rules).
142 See Winick et al., supra note 21, at 206 (suggesting therapeutic benefits from Kendra's
Law).
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outpatient commitment. 143 The advocate employing mediation techniques,
while keeping in mind the client's objectives, can enhance the client's role
in the decision-making process and advocate for treatment in a form that is
more amenable to the client. 144 In a situation where the client cannot
realistically avoid an outpatient commitment order, a lawyer employing
mediation techniques may be able to help the client obtain treatment in a
form the client is willing to accept. 145 Furthermore, the cooperative process
mediation may benefit the client's relationship with his or her physician by
encouraging a relationship of trust. 146 However, even when employing
mediation, the attorney must keep in mind the objectives of his client and
support the client if a dispute cannot be resolved. 47 In addition, the
restrictions that exist within the hearing
process itself may limit the
48
attorney's ability to engage in mediation.
Some clients may benefit from an outpatient commitment order
even though they consent to treatment. 49 For example, some patients'
awareness of their mental illness fluctuates over time, and, therefore, their
willingness to continue treatment also changes. 50 Such patients may seek
an outpatient commitment order during a period of greater mental capacity
to ensure that they continue treatment during periods when they are unable
to perceive their need for it.' 5 ' Other clients may wish to undergo
treatment in the community but cannot consistently perform tasks such as
See Chen_ supra note 13, at 610-11 (outlining mediation-based approach to mental health
representation); see also Dlugacz, supra note 11, at 92-93 (suggesting IOC may be useful in
obtaining services for voluntary clients).
144 See Dlugacz, supra note 11, at 92-93 (prescribing role of advocate in obtaining services
more acceptable to client); Chen, supra note 13, at 611-12 (arguing for mediation approach to
obtain less restrictive services for client).
145 See Dlugacz, supra note 11, at 92-93 (suggesting participation in treatment plan may
increase clients' willingness to undergo treatment).
146 See Chen_ supra note 13, at 610-11 (arguing mediation avoids destructive effect of
adversarial proceedings on client's relationship with doctor). This is only the case if the client's
doctor is amenable to participating in the mediation process. Id. at 611.
147 See Abisch, supra note 13, at 136-37 (emphasizing that mediational lawyer does not have
neutral role but represents interests of client).
148 See Winick et al., supra note 21, at 197 (stating time period in Kendra's Law petitions
places limitation on advocacy). In Kendra's Law proceedings, a hearing must be held within
three days and can take place in the absence of the client, making it difficult or impossible for the
attorney to adequately communicate with the client. See id
149 See Dlugacz, supra note 11, at 92 (suggesting advocate obtain most suitable treatment
plan for willing client).
150 See Torrey & Zdanowicz, supra note 27, at 337-38 (describing patients' fluctuating
awareness of condition). Some patients feel that they are "better" after a period of being on
medication and therefore discontinue the medication, worsening their condition. See id
151 See id at 339-40 (stating patients may seek to authorize treatment in advance in case of
future need).
143
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going to appointments or filling prescriptions. 5 2 Such clients are likely to
benefit significantly by outpatient commitment, as it allows them to obtain
oversight of their treatment while living in the community.153 In this
context, the advocate's role is to ensure that the treatment provided is
appropriate to the client's needs. 54
In some cases, clients may be unable to avoid an IOC order despite
their objections.' 5 5 In this case, the advocate can determine the nature of
the client's objection to treatment and assist the client in obtaining
alterations to the treatment plan to make it more amenable. 5 6 For example,
if a patient objects to a particular medication, the advocate can aid the
client in substituting a different medication or lowering the dosage. 5 7 The
advocate can also attempt to procure non-medication services, which may
help the client gain control over his or her symptoms. 158
In order to give attorneys the ability to advocate on behalf of their
clients, OPC statutes should be constructed to protect the procedural rights
of patients. 1 59 At a minimum, statutes should provide the patient the right
16
to counsel and the ability to provide input into the ordered treatment. 0

However, even when these rights are protected, the context of the hearings
may still produce barriers to client-centered advocacy. 16 1 For example,

152

See Scherer, supra note 8, at 375-76 (describing symptoms of severe mental illness).

People with severe mental illness often suffer deficits in attention and cognition that can lead to
difficulty with daily tasks. Id. at 375.
153 See Winick et al., supra note 21, at 206 (noting avoidance of hospitalization
and input
into treatment plan as therapeutic aspects of Kendra' s Law).
154 See Dlugacz, supra note 11, at 92-93 (suggesting advocate's role may include securing
more services for client).
155 See PERLIN, supra note 22, at 90-91 (noting ease of obtaining commitment order in
inpatient commitment context). Because testimony in commitment proceedings often hinges on
the respondent's likelihood to self-medicate, the client's opposition may paradoxically cause him
or her to be seen as especially in need of a commitment order. Id. at 92-93.
156 See Dlugacz, supra note 11, at 92-93 (suggesting patient may be more likely to accept
treatment plan when involved in creating it); see also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(i)(2)
(Consol. Supp. 2012) (guaranteeing respondent opportunity to participate in treatment plan).
157 See Dlugacz, supra note 11, at 92 (recommending advocate should closely examine
services prescribed in treatment plan).
158 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 11 (listing services provided to Kendra's Law
recipients). Seventy-five percent of people under a Kendra's Law order participated in therapy,
while thirty-one percent received housing or housing supervision. Id.
159 See Dlugacz, supra note 11, at 90-91 (emphasizing role of advocates in IOC
proceedings).
160 See Torrey & Zdanowicz, supra note 27, at 340 (arguing for patient's right to counsel
in
defense of IOC); O'Connor, supra note 7, at 340-41 (emphasizing importance of right to counsel
in context of Kendra's Law).
161 See O'Connor, supra note 7, at 341-42 (summarizing barriers to effective
representation);
Strang, supra note 2, at 274-76 (outlining proposals to refine proposed Ohio statute).
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Kendra's Law hearings must take place within three days of the petition,
leaving little time for the attorney to prepare the case and making it
difficult even to meet with the client before the hearing. 162 Similarly,
although Kendra's Law provides for the right to participate in the treatment
plan, the physician may submit the treatment plan at the hearing, leaving
the advocate with no chance to discuss its terms with the client or to
attempt to negotiate outside of the adversarial context. 1 63 In order to
protect the patient's right to self-determination as much as possible, the
opportunity to participate should be protected by ensuring a procedure for
the patient to contribute to the treatment plan before it is presented to the
court. 164 Finally, to ensure consideration of the patient's autonomy in
practice, both petitioners and courts must come to reject presumptions of
the patient's incompetence
and respect their ability to provide input into
65
their own treatment. 1

V. CONCLUSION
For

the

moment,

courts

constitutionality of IOC statutes.

appear

willing

to

uphold

the

However, these statutes nevertheless

allow a significant intrusion into the autonomy of mentally ill individuals.
In order to provide protection to people subject to IOC, statutes should
provide procedural safeguards, including the right to an attorney and the
ability to provide substantive input into the treatment plan. Furthermore,

the hearing process must be structured in a way that protects the subject's
ability to exercise his or her rights in practice. Finally, attorneys for people

subject to an IOC petition must be prepared to take an active role in
protecting the autonomy interests of their clients. Attorneys should
advocate for their clients' stated objectives and, to the extent possible,

162

See Winick et al., supra note 21, at 197 (setting out limitations of time period on effective

advocacy).
163 See O'Connor, supra note 7, at 341-42 (pointing out treatment plan can be submitted at
time of hearing). When the physician writes the treatment plan without consulting the patient and
the court must make its decision on the plan as written, the patient's opportunity to participate in
the treatment plan is unlikely to substantively effect treatment options. See id. at 347-49.
164 See id. at 348 (arguing "opportunity to actively participate" does not sufficiently protect
patient's interest); Strang, supra note 2, at 275 (proposing requirement of formal meeting
between patient and physician for Jason's Law). Strang proposes that the patient be given a
formal meeting with the examining physician to discuss the treatment plan before the hearing,
although he stops short of allowing the patient veto power over portions of the plan. Strang,
supra note 2, at 275. A similar solution could be to give the patient limited veto power if he or
she proposes an equally effective treatment. Id.
165 See Winick et al., supra note 21, at 194-95 (arguing courts engage in implied presumption
of incompetency during hearings on treatment).
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assist clients in exercising their right to determine the proper course of
treatment.
R. A. Bernfeld

